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ABSTRACT 
 
PATRICK O’DONNELL: It’s All the Same, Only the Names Have Changed: the Impact 
of the Kosovo Issue on Domestic Politics in Post-Milosevic Serbia 
(Under the direction of Dr. Milada Anna Vachudova) 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the link between the Kosovo issue and 
Serbian domestic politics. My hypothesis is that Kosovo has been decisive in turning 
Serbia away from the European Union and the West and toward ultra-nationalism. 
Shunning the West and EU membership allows corrupt politicians to delay political and 
economic reforms that would likely impact the way they profit from the Serbian political 
system. There is also a measure of ethnic outbidding that is taking place. Although some 
political parties are willing to compromise on Kosovo, they do not feel it is a politically 
viable position to hold. With the election of Boris Tadic and his pro-reform Democratic 
Party in 2008, however, Serbia may be ready to move past an issue that has held its 
politics hostage since the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On July 22, 2010, car horns blared and shouts of joy rang out across Kosovo. On 
that day, the International Court of Justice handed down its ruling on the contentious 
issue of Kosovo’s independence. While a celebratory feeling spread across Kosovo, 
frustration and disappointment was felt throughout Serbia. Vuk Jeremic, Serbia’s foreign 
minister, said before the decision that a ruling in Kosovo’s favor would set a global 
precedent and that “no border in the world would ever be secure” (The Economist, 2010). 
It was another chapter in a long-running saga that has consumed the region and at times 
drawn the attention of international powers.  
Kosovo has been one of the central issues in Serbian politics since the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. While most of the other states in the 
region eventually moved away from ultra-nationalist politics, the situation in Kosovo has 
allowed Serbian political elites to stoke the embers of nationalism until today. This has 
helped keep Serbia out of the orbit of the European Union and the West. Although the 
2008 election of Boris Tadic and his Democratic Party signaled a move toward 
embracing the EU, the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party still received considerable 
electoral support. All but one party in the Serbian parliament, including the ruling 
Democratic Party, routinely present the loss of Kosovo as a fundamental problem for 
Serbia.  
This purpose of this thesis is to explore the link between the Kosovo issue and 
Serbian domestic politics: What kinds of incentives has the Kosovo issue created for 
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Serbia’s political parties? Following on that, why are Serbian politicians willing to use 
Kosovo and maintain a political discourse so deeply rooted in ultra-nationalism?  
My hypothesis is that Kosovo has been a decisive factor in turning Serbia away 
from the EU and the West and toward ultra-nationalism and Russia. This has happened 
for two reasons: The first is that shunning the West and also EU membership allows 
corrupt politicians to delay much-needed political and economic reforms that would 
almost certainly have an impact on the way they profit from the Serbian political system. 
Having to come in line with European Union norms and standards would call for more 
transparency and accountability, making rent-seeking much more difficult. Nationalist 
politicians and parties use Kosovo both to foment support for their positions and also take 
the attention away from other problems in Serbian society. The rejection of the West and 
the EU by Serbian leaders has not always been explicit. Vojislav Kostunica, former 
president and prime minister of Serbia, often projected himself as a reformer and 
modernizer to the outside world. The truth is that his party often formed coalitions with 
ultra-nationalist parties in parliament and did very little to cut ties with many members of 
the Milosevic regime.  
The second reason is that a measure of ethnic outbidding is taking place. 
Although some political parties are willing to compromise on Kosovo, they do not feel it 
is a politically viable position to hold. Without at least saying Kosovo is a fundamental 
issue for Serbia, these pro-EU parties feel they will lose electoral support. Pro-reform 
parties espouse hard-line rhetoric on Kosovo, but recent evidence seems to show that they 
are willing to compromise to some degree. Both corruption and ethnic outbidding have 
delayed reforms in Serbia and allowed most of the other states from the former 
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Yugoslavia to pass it on the road to EU accession. For much of the last decade Serbian 
political discourse has been mired in a morass of post-Milosevic nationalism.   
This thesis is divided into six sections, followed by a conclusion. The first section 
explains how Kosovo came to be so important to the Serbian people. A battle waged in a 
field in Kosovo more than 600 years ago has been ingrained in Serbian consciousness as 
one of the most sacred moments in Serbian history. This battle has been exploited by 
nationalists to a large degree since the breakup of Yugoslavia, beginning with Milosevic 
in 1987.  
The second section demonstrates, on a larger scale, how Kosovo has had an 
impact Serbian politics by comparing Serbia to other countries from the region. Although 
Serbia shares a post-World War II political history with countries such as Croatia, 
Slovenia and Montenegro, it has been one of the slowest to move toward the EU. I will 
also compare Serbia to two nearby states that had illiberal regimes following 
communism, Romania and Bulgaria. Unlike Serbia, they were able to move past 
illiberalism and ultra-nationalism to eventually join the EU, albeit with some difficulties. 
I contend that what made Serbia different from all these other countries is the Kosovo 
issue. There is no territorial problem of this magnitude in these other states. Kosovo has 
made it worthwhile for Serbian elites and political parties to continue to rely on 
nationalist rhetoric to gain electoral support.  
The third section shows how and why Serbian politicians and parties have used 
nationalism and Kosovo for electoral gain in the post-Milosevic era. Upon coming to 
power following Milosevic’s ouster, new Serb leader Vojislav Kostunica did very little to 
break with the previous regime. Corrupt elements continued to participate in the Serbian 
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government, using ties ultra-nationalist parties to remain in power. The Kosovo issue 
never allowed for true debate over political and economic reform in Serbia to take place.   
The fourth section will explore the link between nationalism and corruption. 
Nationalist Serbian political elites are mistrustful of the EU, not only because many EU 
countries supported Kosovo’s independence, but also because acceding to the EU would 
mean significant political and economic reforms. By looking at Transparency 
International’s corruption index we will see that Serbia has a corrupt political and 
economic system. The changes that the EU would press upon Serbian elites would 
threaten their rent-seeking capabilities. This has an impact on party incentives because it 
makes joining the EU much less attractive for political elites – and especially for some of 
their key financial backers.   
In the fifth section, Serbia since the rise of Boris Tadic and his pro-EU 
parliamentary coalition will be explored. Despite hard-line rhetoric on Kosovo, including 
sending the foreign minister on a tour of world capitals to argue Serbia’s position prior to 
the ICJ ruling, Tadic and his coalition have continued down a pro-EU, pro-Western path. 
Serbia has officially applied for EU membership and even sat down with Kosovo in talks 
sponsored by the EU. The tide may finally be turning away from an obsession with 
Kosovo and toward something more meaningful and beneficial for Serbian society. 
In the sixth section I will explore alternate ideas of why Serbia has been slow to 
reform and join the EU. Jelena Subotic writes that the difference between Serbia and 
Croatia is that Croatia had a Western orientation and saw joining the EU as a return to 
Europe. Serbia, with its culture of victimhood, instead sees international actors as threats. 
She claims these perceptions of Europe color politics to this day in the two countries. 
5 
 
Another idea that has been put forward is that the remnants of Milosevic’s security forces 
have held massive amounts of political and economic power in Serbia, making any 
reform difficult.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER ONE 
Why is Kosovo Important to Serbia? 
On June 28, 1389, in a field in Kosovo, two armies stood opposite each other. On 
one side stood Sultan Murad and his forces from the Ottoman Empire. On the other was 
Stefan Lazar Hrebeljanovic, the most powerful prince of the Serbs, along with his allies. 
By the end of the day, both Murad and Lazar were dead and the Ottomans controlled the 
battleground. The two sides both sustained heavy losses and, despite an Ottoman victory, 
the sultan’s forces quickly returned to Anatolia to complete the transition of power from 
the deceased Murad to his son Bayezit. Aside from these facts, little more is known about 
that day. It was a bloody fight in a series of battles throughout the Balkans at the time 
(Malcolm, 1998; Bieber, 2002). The difference is that this battle would go on to 
eventually form a crucial part of Serb cultural identity and be called upon many times 
throughout history as an example of Serb bravery in the face of defeat. It is perhaps the 
central myth to Serb identity and is the reason why ties to Kosovo remain so strong in 
Serbia today. What has emerged is something scholars call the “Kosovo myth”, although 
the truth is that it did not takes its primal place in Serb consciousness until the 18th or 19th 
century. 
Since the ascension of this battle’s centrality to Serb identity, June 28 has time 
and again marked dramatic turning points in Serb history. It was the day that Gavrilo 
Princip assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. In 1921, the Kingdom of the 
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Serbs, Croats and Slovenes passed a constitution. Slobodan Milosevic gave his fiery 
speech in Kosovo on that day in 1989, the 600-year anniversary of the battle. It was also 
the day that Milosevic was extradited to The Hague for prosecution at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 2001 (Bieber, 2002).  
Although not central to Serb identity yet, songs and hymns were composed to 
commemorate the men who died in the battle. One such song concerns a knight named 
Milos Obilic (or Kobilic). In the song, Obilic pretends to be a traitor of the Serb forces as 
a way of gaining entry into the Ottoman camp. When he is close enough, he kills Sultan 
Murad, becoming a champion of the Serbian people. Although the veracity of this story is 
in doubt, Obilic is seen as a major symbol of Serbian identity, willing to risk his life for 
his nation, the ultimate Serb martyr. Another story has to do with a Judas figure of 
Serbian mythology, Vuk Brankovic. According to the story, he betrayed his Serbian 
compatriots and was the reason for Serb defeat. Along with the loss in the battle, this 
story of treason helped to cement the Serb feeling of victimhood, that they are the 
perpetual losers of history (Bieber, 2002).   
Although stories of the battle lived on through song, the historic significance of 
the day had more or less receded into the background of Serbian identity for generations. 
By the 1600s, only one church, Ravanica, commemorated Lazar’s passing. In fact, it was 
not even an official holiday in the Serbian Church until the end of the 19th century 
(Malcolm, 1998).   
At the end of the 1700s, nationalist sentiment swept throughout Europe. As ethnic 
groups around the continent began to explore their historical and cultural identities, men 
such as Serbian linguist Vuk Karadzic and writer Petar Petrovic lifted the Battle of 
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Kosovo to the status of a momentous Serbian cultural event. Although a battle did take 
place in Kosovo that day, the major significance attributed to it was largely a social 
construction. It was now the moment the Serbs lost their autonomy to their Ottoman 
rulers and was the end of a Serbian Golden Age. In the reconstructed myths of the 19th 
century, Lazar was given a choice between a kingdom in heaven or a kingdom on earth 
(Malcolm, 1998). He chose a kingdom in heaven. This guaranteed a loss on the 
battlefield but won a special place with God for the Serbian people (Bieber, 2002).  
At the beginning of the 19th century, Serbs began to rebel against Ottoman 
authority. The first major uprising started in 1804. The Serbs eventually gained the right 
to collect taxes, some of which went to the raising of small militias. Ottoman Janissaries, 
a group of bodyguards and soldiers expelled from the army, were now living in the 
Western Balkans. These Janissaries attempted to peel back the rights the Serbs had 
gained and began a period of violent crackdowns on Serb village leaders. Serbs then 
fought back, led by a man named Karadjordje Petrovic. While Ottoman troops were 
preoccupied with various conflicts in Europe, the Serb rebels had a string of victories. 
When the conflicts in Europe finally abated, Ottoman leaders used their troops to crush 
the Serbian rebellion (Lampe, 2000). 
A second rebellion began in 1815 under Milos Obrenovic. Through uprisings and 
skillful diplomacy, Obrenovic was able to secure significant Serb autonomy by 1830 
(Lampe, 2000). Serbians again took up arms against the Ottomans in 1876, this time 
alongside Bosnian rebels. Unrest throughout the Balkans led to the Congress of Berlin in 
1878, a meeting where major European powers reconfigured the map to reflect new 
political realities. With Russian backing, Serbia gained full independence from the 
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Ottomans. The Serbs, along with a sizeable number of soldiers from other Balkan groups, 
then ejected the Ottoman Empire from its remaining European possessions in 1913 
(United States Department of State, n.d.).    
The post-Ottoman era is critical for understanding the relationship between Serbs 
and other groups in the Balkans. After independence, Serbians asserted a leading role in 
the region. They saw themselves as the most influential and powerful of the southern 
Slavs and looked to assert political and cultural control over other groups. 
Unsurprisingly, non-Serbs wanted a more equitable share of power and resented Serbia’s 
attempts at hegemony. 
These conflicts were interrupted by World War II, when Axis forces took control 
of Serbia. Serbian soldiers, loyal to the Yugoslav crown and called Chetniks, fought the 
occupation. Eventually, Communist guerillas under Josip Broz Tito, along with Allied 
support, were able to drive the Axis out and also subdue the Chetniks. Tito then created a 
communist Yugoslavia. This new state, although dominated by Serbs in many important 
areas, took steps to quell nationalist sentiments (United States Department of State, 
2011).  Tension among groups remained, but ethnic animosity was pushed below the 
surface of Yugoslav daily life. Although the Serbian Orthodox Church continued to 
commemorate the June 28 anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, the Church was 
marginalized under Tito and had little influence on the general public (Bieber, 2002). 
This began to change in the 1970s and 1980s. After Yugoslavia adopted a new 
Constitution in 1974, Kosovar Albanians were given increased rights and autonomy. 
Upon Tito’s death in 1980, however, these rights were in danger of being rolled back. In 
1981, unrest began when Kosovo Albanian university students protested the poor quality 
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of food at their school. This largely apolitical event morphed into a month-long 
demonstration that called for Kosovo to be given republic status, which would ensure that 
Kosovo would keep the autonomy it had gained from the Constitution of 1974 (Morus, 
2007). 
Serbs in Kosovo began to feel threatened by the increase in Albanian political 
activity and saw it as an affront to the Serbian spiritual homeland. Shortly after the 1981 
Kosovo Albanian university demonstrations, the Serbian Orthodox Church took up the 
Serbian cause. A petition signed by 21 priests called for the government to increase the 
protection of Serbs and Serb cultural landmarks in the province. Serbian writers and 
intellectuals, such as Danko Popovic and Vuk Draskovic, then began to incorporate the 
Kosovo myth into their work, fanning the flames of Serb nationalism. The myth was used 
to make the case that Kosovo belonged only to the Serbian people (Bieber, 2002).  
These tensions eventually spilled into violence, resulting in a number of Serbs 
fleeing Kosovo for Serbia, which prompted the Serbian media to report a large-scale 
emigration. Azem Vlassi, the Communist leader of Kosovo, called upon Serbian 
president Ivan Stambolic to intervene and calm the situation. Stambolic instead made the 
fateful decision to send his second-in-command, Slobodan Milosevic (Bieber, 2002; 
Morus, 2007).  
Milosevic arrived in Kosovo in April 1987, greeted by a throng of Kosovo Serbs. 
This group told Milosevic about the harassment and abuse heaped upon them by the local 
police forces, which were made up of largely Albanian officers (Morus, 2007). Milosevic 
was to give a speech in Kosovo Polje, near the location of the 1389 battle. Before giving 
the speech, he was caught on camera telling local Serbs that “No one has the right to beat 
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the people!” His comments were rebroadcast throughout Serbia, rekindling the fires of 
Serbian nationalism. This was a dramatic shift from the usual political rhetoric of the 
Yugoslav political elites, who took great pains not to pit one ethnic group against another 
(Bozic-Roberson, 2005).  
This utterance by Milosevic, seemingly done in an offhand manner, helped fuel 
his political ascendance. Scenes of police beating Serb protestors in Kosovo were also 
beamed throughout Serbia, adding fuel to the fire. What was lost in the news reports was 
the fact that the Serb protestors had been throwing rocks at the police in an attempt to get 
a reaction. Without this context, Milosevic was seen as standing up for a victimized Serb 
population (Morus, 2007).  
Milosevic gave a speech the next day, exhorting the Serbs in Kosovo to stay in 
their homes and fight for their ancestral homeland. He said that Serbs were a proud 
people who did not back down. Their ancestors had fought and died for Serbia hundreds 
of years before, now it was their turn. Unlike the battle against the Ottomans, Milosevic 
said this was a battle the Serbs would win (Morus, 2007).  
Sensing it was his time, Milosevic called on a session of the Serbian parliament to 
unseat his mentor, President Stambolic, in September 1987. After months of 
equivocating, Stambolic left office in December and Milosevic took control of the 
Serbian Communist Party. Seeking to consolidate his power, Milosevic traveled the 
Serbian countryside attempting to appeal to nascent feelings of Serbian nationalism. In 
1988, Milosevic spoke to a crowd of a million people in Belgrade, calling upon past 
fights against Turkish and German invaders and comparing that to the fight in 
contemporary Kosovo (Morus, 2007).  
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Milosevic’s hold on power tightened in 1989 when he was named to the 
presidency of Serbia. To commemorate this event, he planned an inaugural address in 
Kosovo on the 600th anniversary of the mythical battle. Estimates for those in attendance 
were between one and two million people (Bieber, 2002; Morus, 2007). Some hopeful 
observers thought the event might be a call for national unity and pan-Yugoslavia ideals. 
Instead it was a reinforcement of Serbian nationalism. Milosevic ratcheted up his 
nationalist rhetoric, at one point foreshadowing the conflict to come: “Six centuries later, 
now, we are again engaged in battle and are facing battles. They are not armed battles, 
although such things cannot be excluded yet” (Milosevic, 1989).   
After taking power, Milosevic went about dismantling the autonomy that Kosovo 
had gained before the death of Tito. The irony in this is that Milosevic was a latecomer to 
the Serb nationalist cause. In 1986, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences released a 
memorandum that said Serbs in Kosovo were under siege by the Albanian population and 
that Serbs in Croatia also faced grave threats. It was an incendiary and significant 
statement put forward by Serbian elites. The Yugoslavian leadership took steps to 
denounce the document and separate themselves from it. One of the leaders who 
dismissed the memorandum was Milosevic. His embrace of nationalism was more likely 
a method to gain power than a sincere feeling, setting a template for future Serbian 
politicians (Glenny, 2000). 
As the 1990s continued, much of the former Yugoslavia descended into war. 
Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1992. And while 
Slovenia was able to leave relatively unscathed, Croatia was not as fortunate. Much of the 
fighting centered in and around Bosnia, where Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks engaged in the 
13 
 
bloodiest conflict Europe had seen since World War II. Ethnic Serb paramilitaries in 
Bosnia committed war crimes as they destroyed Bosniak villages and raped and murdered 
civilians in their efforts to cleanse large parts of the country of Bosniaks. Croats engaged 
in similar crimes trying cleanse “their” part of Bosnia. Bosniaks were also implicated in 
war crimes by the end of the bloody 4.5 year war. This led to the term “ethnic cleansing” 
entering the common lexicon. Sarajevo, which had hosted the Winter Olympics in 1984, 
was the subject of persistent Serbian shelling attacks, which culminated in the February 
5, 1994 bombing of the Markale market, which left more than 60 people dead and 
shocked the world. The fighting finally came to a stop after the massacre in Srebrenica of 
8,000 Bosniak men and boys spurred NATO to bomb Serb military positions in August 
1995. A complicated peace was at last brokered in November 1995 with the signing of 
the Dayton Accords (Glenny, 2000). 
During this time, the Kosovo issue faded to the background of Serbian politics. 
The Albanians, led by Ibrahim Rugova, created a parallel state within Serbia. This state 
had its own “taxes, parliamentary committees, private health service, and, most 
impressively, unofficial education system” (Garton Ash, 1999, para. 16). This method of 
asserting power was rooted in Rugova’s adherence to non-violent pacifism. Although he 
never wavered from his call for an independent Kosovo, he also never wavered from his 
non-violent methods, much to the relief of Western powers (Garton Ash, 1999).  
Paradoxically, what started the conflict in Kosovo may have been the Dayton 
Accords. Albanian activists were angered that the U.S. made Milosevic sign a deal over 
Bosnia but did nothing to advance the cause of Kosovo. Many Kosovo Albanians were 
starting to feel that Rugova’s emphasis on non-violence was largely ineffectual. More 
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ominously, Dayton showed Albanians that violence was effective for bringing about 
change. Without using force to grab the attention of the U.S. and Europe, Albanians felt 
that their status in Kosovo would not change (Garton Ash, 1999).  
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) soon emerged as a challenge to Rugova’s 
leadership. It sought direct armed conflict with Serbia. Formed in the early 1990s, its 
early history was inauspicious. When the attacks began, Rugova said it was the work of 
the Serbian police to try to foment discontent with his pacifistic approach. When the 
government of Albania collapsed in 1997, KLA operatives amassed weapons from 
military arsenals and were ready to step up attacks on Serb targets in Kosovo. As time 
passed and the attacks seemed successful, the KLA and its methods gathered the support 
of much of the Kosovo Albanian population (Mulaj, 2008).  
Milosevic decided to respond swiftly and with force. The Serbian military was 
dispatched to the area and retaliated with ferocity. Serbian reprisals were so severe that 
the international community began to take notice of Kosovo. Although there is some 
dispute over when the refugee crisis started, the official NATO account says that before 
the bombing campaign “Tens of thousands of people began to flee their homes in the face 
of this systematic offense” (NATO, 1999, para. 16). NATO, fearing a repeat of Bosnia, 
eventually decided to step in with air attacks in March 1999. Milosevic answered by 
creating a refugee crisis to destabilize the entire region and permanently change the 
ethnic composition of Kosovo. His forces swept through Kosovo and ejected more than 
800,000 Albanians from their homes (OSCE, 1999) and killed 10,000 more (Ball, Betts, 
Scheuren, Dudukovich, J., & Asher, J., 2002).  
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Some have posited that Milosevic became involved in Kosovo not to protect 
Serbs, but as an attempt to maintain power. A crisis would allow Milosevic to clamp 
down on political opponents, who had taken to the streets on various occasions during the 
preceding three years. Even if he had to acquiesce to NATO, it would fall in line with the 
Serbian myth of victimhood, with a foreign power once again making Serbs the victims 
of history. It would also be easier to lose to a coalition of Western nations than to guerilla 
KLA fighters. Milosevic may have calculated that he could use war in Kosovo as a way 
of stirring up nationalistic fervor and consolidate flagging political support (Katz, 1999). 
One author wrote  
once the fire of ethnic nationalism has been lit, especially when combined with 
the security dilemma, it can spread uncontrollably and do great damage. So 
Milosevic’s rule can be viewed as that of a typical totalitarian dictator confronted 
with the collapse of the basis of his support, who responded to this collapse by 
playing with the fire of ethnic nationalism. (Wintrobe, 2002, p. 2) 
 
After seeing the international community equivocate during the Bosnia War, 
Milosevic thought that he could wait out the bombing, which would eventually cause rifts 
in within NATO. Instead, his attacks on Kosovo Albanians hardened the resolve of 
NATO members and made Serbia an international pariah (Mulaj, 2008).  
Due to the dispersion tactics used by Serbian troops, at first the NATO bombing 
campaign met with little success. When NATO commanders instead decided to bomb 
strategic targets within Serbia, Milosevic finally started to crack. The bombs used by 
American war planes were the most precise in the world, leading to a relatively low 
amount of civilian casualties. Milosevic was forced to take his troops out of Kosovo and 
Albanians displaced by the fighting returned to their homes. The United Nations Security 
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Council then passed Resolution 1244, which set the terms for administrative and 
governmental control of Kosovo by international actors (Papasotiriou. 2002).  
 
Regime Change Comes to Serbia 
By the fall of 2000, the people of Serbia were sick of the Milosevic regime. On 
September 24, Vojislav Kostunica defeated Milosevic in an election. Not satisfied with 
the result, Milosevic called for a run-off election in early October. In response, the 
Serbian people took to the streets. The opposition that had risen up against Milosevic in 
the past finally had the support of the Serbian populace. Milosevic left office in early 
October, ending a period of leadership marked by four wars and economic ruin (The 
Economist, 2000). He was then arrested in March 2001 and extradited to The Hague to 
face war crimes charges at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(BBC, 2001; BBC, 2001a). Milosevic went on trial and acted as his own lawyer, 
perpetually questioning the legitimacy of the tribunal (Bass, 2003). A judgment could 
never be handed down since Milosevic died in his cell of a heart attack in 2006 (BBC, 
2006).  
The man who swore he would save Kosovo for the Serbs in the end lost it. The 
Milosevic era was the culmination of Serbian nationalism and the myth of Kosovo’s role 
in it. It led the country on a path to economic and physical destruction. Despite this, 
Kosovo lingers in the hearts and minds of the people of Serbia to this day. They still elect 
far-right nationalist parties and Kosovo is still a major issue for the electorate. The events 
of the 1990s reinforced the self-image of Serbians as victims of history and delayed the 
country’s economic and political development. But Serbia was not alone in being in war 
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in the 1990s, nor was it alone in having an illiberal regime following the collapse of 
communism. I will now explore how Serbia fared compared to neighboring countries in 
similar situations, which will help demonstrate the centrality of the Kosovo issue in 
Serbian politics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
Serbia in Context 
In distilling whether or not Kosovo is the most critical issue that prevents Serbia 
from turning to the West and the EU, it is helpful to look at surrounding countries who 
have shared much of Serbia’s history since World War II. Perhaps other factors are 
critical to Serbia’s reluctance in joining the West. When examining these other states, 
however, it becomes apparent that the shared political history of Yugoslavia and 
communism did not prevent Serbia’s neighbors from looking to join the EU. If the 
comparison is expanded to include nearby states that also had illiberal regimes following 
the collapse of communism, Serbia still lags behind in satisfying the requirements for EU 
membership. The one critical factor none of these countries had was a domestic conflict 
such as Kosovo. Ultra-nationalist leaders in other countries had no similar issue to exploit 
for support, and the electorates did not have an emotional concern which occupied as 
much attention.  
One theory for Serbia’s delay was that it was involved in numerous costly wars 
and was seen as the aggressor by the international community. This stunted Serbia’s 
political and economic development while also reinforcing the Serbian image of 
victimhood. Although the wars and their aftermath were significant in delaying Serbia’s 
development, they are not the only reasons. Croatia, Bosnia, and to a lesser extent 
Montenegro, were involved in the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Bosnia has been held back 
by a complicated political system that reinforces ethnic divisions, but Croatia and 
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Montenegro have sped past Serbia in the accession process. My contention is that Serbian 
politicians, instead of spending the last decade modernizing the political and economic 
systems and moving the country in line with EU norms, have instead used the Kosovo 
issue to maintain power and delay reform.  
Another issue which has held Serbia back has been cooperation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Some of the most 
popular parties, such as the Serbian Radical Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia, 
oppose cooperation with the ICTY. Non-compliance has been severe that in April 2006 
negotiations on Serbia’s Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU were 
suspended (International Crisis Group, 2007). The Netherlands has been particularly 
insistent that Serbia find Ratko Mladic, one of the two remaining ICTY fugitives, going 
so far as to block the passing of the SAA until he is found (Balkan Insight, 2008). The 
Netherlands finally dropped its opposition to the SAA in 2010, allowing the accession 
process to continue even though Mladic still remains at large (Lungescu, 2010). 
The ICTY, however, does not have the widespread appeal of Kosovo to Serbian 
voters. Nationalist parties would have a far more difficult time getting votes if 
cooperation with the ICTY were the sole issue that stirred the Serbian electorate. So 
although the ICTY has definitely slowed down EU progress, it has not been the most 
important factor. Kosovo has far more power with the Serbian electorate and has allowed 
nationalist parties to maintain their popularity.  
To help see this clearly, a comparison between Serbia and local states is 
instructive. Regarding the EU accession process, Serbia has been slower than 
neighboring countries. It did not officially apply to the EU until December 2009, and did 
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not initial its Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), an important initial step 
toward EU membership, until the end of 2007. Montenegro, which was the same political 
entity as Serbia until 2006, was able to apply to the EU and initial the SAA before Serbia. 
As for other former Yugoslavia countries, Slovenia became a member of the EU in 1996, 
far faster than any other Yugoslav republic. Croatia applied for membership in 2003 and 
has been named an official EU candidate country. Other official candidate countries from 
the former Yugoslavia are Macedonia, which applied in 2004, and Montenegro, which 
applied in 2007. 
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Table 1: 
European Union Accession: 
Serbia Compared to Its Neighbors 
Country Application Date SAA Initialed EU Entry Notes on 
Accession 
Serbia 12/2009 11/2007 Not a member  
Bosnia Has not applied 12/2007 Not a member Cannot submit a 
formal 
application until 
the Office of the 
High 
Representative is 
abolished 
Bulgaria 12/1995 No SAA 
necessary at the 
time of accession 
– had the 
European 
Agreement 
01/2007  
Croatia 02/2003 05/2001 Not a member Official EU 
candidate country 
Macedonia 03/2004 11/2000 Not a member Although an 
official EU 
candidate, a name 
dispute with 
Greece has 
delayed accession 
Montenegro 12/2008 03/2007 Not a member Official EU 
candidate country 
Romania 06/1995 No SAA 
necessary at the 
time of accession 
– had the 
European 
Agreement  
01/2007  
Slovenia 06/1996 No SAA 
necessary at the 
time of accession 
– had the 
European 
Agreement 
05/2004  
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The first comparisons will be with the other states that emerged from Yugoslavia. 
These states had a common political and historical experience with Serbia for much of 
the second half of the 20th century. The country that Serbia is perhaps most often 
compared to is Croatia. Croats were the second largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia after 
the Serbs. From the time that Serbia started to assert itself as the leader of the Slavic 
people in the Western Balkans at the end of the 19th century until the war for 
independence in the 1990s, Croats and Serbs had a difficult relationship. Serbian leaders 
tried to centralize Yugoslavia whereas Croatians wanted, if not their own state, then 
significant regional autonomy (Glenny, 2000).  
Relations hit their nadir during World War II. Croats, given a rump state by the 
occupying Axis powers, ran roughshod over Serbs in the region, committing mass 
atrocities. According to some estimates, the Croatian regime “killed between 320,000 and 
340,000 ethnic Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1941 and 1942” 
(United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, n.d., para. 7). Entire Serb villages were 
burned down and their residents killed, often in brutal fashion (United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, n.d.). The Jasenovac detention facilities, about 60 miles south of 
Zagreb, were a Croatian version of a concentration camp. It is estimated that between 
77,000 and 99,000 people were killed there during the war (United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, n.d.).  
Relations hit another low point in the 1990s, when Serbs tried to assert control 
over the region, leading to a complex conflict involving Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats 
(Glenny, 2000). Interestingly, it was later revealed that Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic and 
Croatia’s Franco Tudjman met to come up with a plan on how to divide Bosnia, leaving 
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Bosnian Muslims out of the process (BBC, 2003). Not long after Croatia declared 
independence, however, Serbs within Croatia appealed to Milosevic for help and war 
broke out between Croatia and the remaining military forces under Milosevic. Around 
20,000 people were killed in Croatia, and nearly a half million became homeless (BBC, 
n.d.). 
Franco Tudjman and his party, the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), were 
similar in many ways to the regime of Milosevic in Serbia. Tudjman and Croatia 
funded Bosnian Croats during the war, some of whom committed atrocities and were 
perpetrators of ethnic cleansing (Maas, 1993). Like Milosevic, Tudjman put into place an 
authoritarian regime that was distrustful of the EU and overtly nationalist. Tudjman saw 
himself as a victor in the Yugoslav wars and felt he had carte blanche to rule in a manner 
he saw fit (Jovic, 2006).  
When he died in 1999, Croatian politicians took a decided turn toward the West 
and the EU. Unlike Serbia, most issues that would conjure Croatian nationalism had been 
resolved by this point, making overtly nationalist politics less viable (Jovic 2006). This 
was largely because Croatia swept away much of its ethnic Serb population during 
Operation Storm in 1995, when the Croatian military forced 200,000 ethnic Serbs to flee 
Croatia, as well as committing atrocities against Serbs and destroying their property 
(Prodger, 2005).  
With no lingering nationalist issues, consensus emerged among the major parties 
that the EU was the right direction for the country. Croatian elites no longer saw merit in 
maintaining an isolationist route. Eventually, Tudjman’s own HDZ party was taken over 
24 
 
by reformer Ivo Sanader, marginalizing what remained of those who subscribed to 
Tudjman’s nationalistic policies (Jovic, 2006).  
Breaking free from the shackles of Tudjman, Croatia stopped vying to be a 
Balkan power competing with Serbia. Political elites instead turned to the EU. Croatia 
took an important first step toward membership when it ratified the EU’s Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement (SAA) in October 2001 (Jovic, 2006). Croatia then submitted 
its application to the EU in 2003 (BBC, 2003). Despite these moves away from 
nationalism, old hardliners remained. Croatia’s accession process was delayed by not 
bringing to justice fugitive war generals. The SAA was not ratified by the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom until 2005 (Jovic, 2006).  
Interestingly, public support for the EU in Croatia has not been strong. In 
Eurobarometer surveys from 2004 to 2009, Croatians who agreed with the statement 
“Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership of the European 
Community (Common Market) is good” have consistently hovered been between 24 and 
35 percent (European Union, 2010)1. Much of the time, as a country heads further down 
the road to EU accession, public support for the EU drops. For example, in Poland, 80 
percent of the population was in support of EU accession in 1997. On the eve of 
membership in 2002, however, that number dropped to 55 percent (Bielasiak, 2002). 
Support for the EU in Croatia has not even been as high as 55 percent over the last seven 
years. Croatia has been more skeptical of the EU than most other acceding countries, 
even noted skeptics Serbia and Poland. A 2011 report from the European Parliament 
expressed concern by writing: 
                                                          
1
 Taken from the Eurobarometer surveys in 10/2004, 06/2005, 19/2005, 04/2006, 05/2007, 10/2007, 04/2008, 
10/2008, 06/2009, and 11/2009. A direct link to the table displaying the survey’s results is in the works cited 
section. 
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MEPs are very concerned that the majority of Croatian citizens think that 
Croatia's EU membership would not benefit the country, according to the latest 
Eurobarometer survey. They therefore urge the Croatian authorities and civil 
society to mobilize and make citizens "feel the European project is theirs as well.” 
(European Parliament, 2011, para. 7) 
   
Despite this and other difficulties, Croatia has been tapped as the frontrunner in 
the EU accession process (European Parliament, 2011). Like Serbia, Croatia had a post-
Communist illiberal regime that espoused nationalist-isolationist rhetoric. Croatia may be 
the country most similar to Serbia and therefore provides the best comparison for how the 
Kosovo issue may have impacted the incentives for its political parties. Although 
nationalists persisted and cooperation with the ICTY was not always forthcoming, 
Croatia was able to move past Tudjman and his legacy. Its political elites were more 
harmonious in their support of EU accession and it is likely that prominent members of 
the Croatian business community also supported moving toward the EU. Serbia, 
burdened by the Kosovo issue, has not been so lucky.2 
Montenegro provides an interesting test case for comparison. Part of the same 
political entity as Serbia from World War II until 2006, it is a state that also shares a 
common language, system of writing, history and religion with Serbia. (Malesevic & 
Uzelac, 2007). Although around 43 percent of people in the country identify themselves 
as Montenegrin, around 32 percent identify as Serbian. These ties were strong enough 
that in an independence referendum in 1992, the people of Montenegro elected to stay in 
a union with Serbia (Darmanovic, 2007).  
Although the results of the vote were somewhat dubious, the message was still 
clear: stay with Serbia. But with Milosevic’s destructive agenda in the 1990s making 
                                                          
2
 Another reason given for Croatia’s ability to move past the Tudjman era is that Croatia was culturally more 
oriented toward Western Europe, a theory which will be discussed in detail in the alternative theories section.  
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Serbia an international pariah, the tide for independence began to turn. Even with the 
downfall of Milosevic in 2000, the Montenegrin independence movement continued 
unabated (Darmanovic, 2007). Voters elected to separate from Serbia in 2006, with the 
number of people voting for independence just barely exceeding the 55 percent threshold. 
The ultra-nationalism that kept its grip on political parties in Serbia did not resonate in 
Montenegro. In fact, it is likely that the anti-EU stance and lack of cooperation with the 
ICTY from Serbian political parties actually worked in favor of the pro-independence 
movement. Montenegrins became frustrated with Serbia’s lack of progress (Emerging 
Europe Monitor, 2006). Following independence, Montenegrin political leaders quickly 
moved to enter the EU. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement was signed in 
October 2007 and Montenegro submitted its application for EU membership in December 
2008 (European Commission, 2011).  
It is important to note that a country that shares a similar historical, political, 
linguistic and religious background with Serbia has come into the EU fold far faster than 
Serbia. Once again, the crucial factor is that the Kosovo issue did not resonate with voters 
in Montenegro as much as it did in Serbia, so voters and political parties alike were able 
to move on to other concerns. The vice grip Kosovo has on Serb identity is not nearly as 
strong in Montenegro.    
Of the countries to emerge from the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia had the 
smoothest route to the European Union. Compared to Serbia, and most of the rest of the 
Yugoslav republics, it had a high level of ethnic homogeneity. Perhaps more importantly, 
it did not have a significant Serbian minority which would draw the attention of 
Milosevic (Mann, 2005). A 10-day conflict did ensue following Slovenia’s declaration of 
27 
 
independence in the summer of 1991, but the well-prepared Slovenian defense was able 
to repel advances by the Yugoslav military. Milosevic was more focused on protecting 
Serbian interests in Croatia at the time and soon removed his troops from Slovenia 
(Lampe, 2000).  
Without the war and ethnic conflict that plagued much of the rest of the former 
Yugoslavia, Slovenia soon embarked on a process of Europeanization. It applied for EU 
membership in 1996, far earlier than any other state from Yugoslavia. It entered the EU 
along with other countries from Eastern Europe in 2004 and the eurozone in 2007 
(Delegation of the European Union to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
2011).  
The two remaining countries from the former Yugoslavia do not provide the best 
basis for comparison. Bosnia was the subject of a vicious war involving Serbs, Bosniaks 
and Croats that did not end until the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995. It split the 
country into two parallel entities, the mixed Croat-Bosniak Federation of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina and the Serbian Repulika Srpska (BBC, 2010). Although Bosnia signed the 
SAA in 2008, it has not yet submitted its application. Bosnia’s Dayton-created political 
framework has institutionalized deep ethnic divisions and created a deadlock on issues 
related to strengthening the central government (Vogel, 2011). Without a new 
constitution that empowers a central government that can implement the EUs acquis 
communautaire and negotiate effectively for EU accession, Bosnia is at a standstill in the 
process.  
Macedonia is also not a good point of comparison for Serbia. Although it escaped 
the wars that engulfed much of the rest of the region, Macedonia experienced ethnic 
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division and conflict. Macedonians include a significant Albanian minority that is around 
25 percent of the population. In 2001 there was an armed uprising of Albanians 
demanding equal rights. Behind a Western-brokered peace deal, called the Ohrid 
Agreement, the two groups came together and have made significant progress in 
integrating Albanians into government institutions (BBC, 2010a).  
The bigger issue regarding EU integration has been a dispute with Greece over 
the name of the country of Macedonia. Greeks feel that a Slavic country taking the name 
of one of its own regions is an affront to Greek culture and may signal future territorial 
claims. Macedonians argue that the name is their identity and that they have nothing to 
change it to. As puzzling as this may be for outsiders, it has been serious enough to 
significantly delay Macedonia’s entry into the EU and NATO. Various attempts at 
international mediation have not met with success. So although Macedonia has taken 
some steps to joining the EU, such as signing the SAA in 2001, full membership will not 
be granted until it solves the name dispute with Greece and improvements are made in its 
occasionally violent election process (International Crisis Group, 2009).   
Although not part of the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania are two 
Balkan countries that struggled in the post-communist era with illiberal regimes and 
provide a good point of comparison for Serbia. Romania was led by Ion Iliescu, head of 
the National Salvation Front (FSN). In a country with no movement like Poland’s 
Solidarity, former communists filled the power vacuum in the transition era. Unlike 
Serbia, there was no divisive issue such as Kosovo that would allow Iliescu to hold on to 
power. To placate the electorate, he had to make some overtures to the West, such as 
strengthening ties with NATO and signing a Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the 
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EU in 1991. Despite these efforts, Iliescu took shots at the Hungarian minority as being 
unpatriotic. When Iliescu and his FSN party saw that they were trailing in the 1996 
elections, they tried to garner support by playing the ethno-nationalist card, blaming 
Hungarians and other minorities for troubles. This did not resonate with the public and 
FSN lost (Vachudova, 2005).  
This is in stark contrast with Serbia, where the nationalist card has been played 
with great frequency and effectiveness. Without anything like Kosovo to truly stir the 
passions of the Romanian electorate, Iliescu’s xenophobic strategy was ineffective. 
Romania continued down its occasionally rocky road toward EU membership, which was 
granted with some ambivalence in 2007. 
Bulgaria also had a circuitous path to the EU. Like Romania, Bulgaria had no 
opposition group similar to Solidarity to help navigate the transition away from 
communism. The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), a party made up of former 
communists, won the 1990 election by promising to manage the economic change to 
capitalism in a manner that would not hurt Bulgarians. Patronage networks intact, BSP 
was an especially corrupt party. It lost elections in 1991 and the opposition Union of 
Democratic Forces (UDF) won. This party reflected the strong pro-Western sentiment of 
Bulgaria and tried to distance itself from the Russian sphere of influence (Vachudova, 
2005).  
The next government did not have a party but was supported by the corrupt BSP. 
When BSP won the 1994 elections, it made no attempt to follow EU economic policies. 
With the international community’s attention focused on the situation in Bosnia, the BSP 
robbed the public coffers of Bulgaria in spectacular fashion, leading to an economic crisis 
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in 1996. Bulgarians responded by holding massive demonstrations, bringing an end to 
BSP rule (Vachudova, 2005). Bulgaria was then able to continue on its path toward EU 
membership in earnest, although like Romania, it was fraught with difficulty. Also like 
Romania, entrenched corruption helped delay Bulgaria’s full accession to the EU three 
years. Bulgaria was finally accepted, with some reservations, in 2007.   
It is not just with EU accession and ICTY cooperation where Serbia has fallen 
behind. A glance at economic measures reveals that Serbia’s lack of reform has kept it 
from developing as much as its neighbors. One way to determine of a country’s wealth is 
purchasing power parity, which seeks to measure the standard of living across different 
states (The Economist, 2011). According to the latest figures from the CIA World 
Factbook, Serbia ranks 103rd, behind Croatia (67th), Romania (96th), Bulgaria (89th) and 
Slovenia (50th). Newly independent Montenegro ranks just behind Serbia at 110th (CIA 
World Factobook, 2011). Although Serbia has made some changes in its economic 
system, a 2009 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development report found 
that legal public monopolies still existed in many important sectors such as transport, 
energy, natural resources and public utilities. The authors concluded that this was why 
“the market economy does not exist to the full extent, thus narrowing the space for 
implementation of competition rules” (OECD, 2009).  
The purpose of this section was to understand Serbia in the context of surrounding 
Balkan states. Many of these countries share a significant part of post-World War II 
history with Serbia. All of these states have decided to become part of the EU and join 
the West. This happened despite ultra-nationalist politics in Croatia, illiberal regimes in 
Romania and Bulgaria, war in Bosnia and a shared cultural background with Montenegro. 
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The critical factor in all these cases is that political parties and elites were not able to use 
a decisive issue such as Kosovo to maintain a hold on power. Serbia, whose political 
discourse remains embroiled in a nationalist debate over Kosovo, has not been able to 
move as quickly toward reform.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
The Kosovo Issue and Nationalism in Post-Milosevic Serbia 
This section will explore how political parties and elites in Serbia have used 
nationalism and the Kosovo issue for electoral gain. Since Milosevic left office, Kosovo 
has remained central to the political debate in Serbia. Anna Di Lellio writes that  
Far from being a marginal disturbance on the path toward European integration, 
or a simple relic of political folklore, the Kosovo ethno-nationalist myth continues 
to frame political choices domestically and internationally, playing both a 
normative and an instrumental role. It fuels the political rhetoric of authoritarian 
and fractious nationalist elites who use it to lay out the moral and political 
obligations to the nation and never cease to tap its capacity for rallying large 
sections of the Serbian public. (Di Lellio, 2009, p. 375) 
 
Kosovo was an issue even before the Milosevic era. Tensions between Serbs and 
Albanians in Kosovo increased following the implementation of the 1974 Constitution. 
Although no politicians took full advantage of Serb unease with Albanians until the rise 
of Milosevic, Serb leadership tried to assert control over Kosovo from 1974 onward. 
Making it difficult for Serbs was the reality of the demographics of the region. Albanians 
had increased from 74 percent of the population of Kosovo in 1971 to around 90 percent 
by the 1990s (Papasotiriou, 2002). 
In 1977, the Serbian League of Communists formed a commission that tried to 
return key elements of governmental control in Kosovo back to Belgrade. Following the 
1981 student uprising at the University of Pristina, the state press claimed that the 
demonstrations were partly orchestrated by the Albanian government, even though there 
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was no evidence of Tirana doing anything more than issuing supportive public 
statements. To make matters worse for Kosovo Albanians, an intense police crackdown 
took place throughout the 1980s for anyone perceived to be advocating Albanian 
nationalism. Arrests and police violence were becoming more common, and ethnic 
Albanians were increasingly demonized. In 1984, a Serbian Orthodox Archimandrite, or 
leader of a monastery, spoke about the mass rapes of Serbian girls and women by 
Albanians, fanning the flames of anti-Albanian sentiment in Serbia. These accusations 
were made even though some studies found that Kosovo had the lowest incidence of rape 
in Yugoslavia, and most cases were between people of the same ethnic group (Bellamy, 
2000). The mounting tension and increasing violence in Kosovo set the stage for the rise 
of Milosevic, who was the first leader to effectively take advantage of Serbian unease 
about Kosovo.   
After the violence subsided and Milosevic was ousted, Kosovo remained a central 
issue in the Serbian political discourse. In a 2004 report on Serbia, International Crisis 
Group wrote “Kosovo continues to hold Serbian politics hostage and push it toward 
nationalism. Any politician who attempts to sign any form of political settlement with the 
Albanians places both his life and his political future at risk” (International Crisis Group, 
2004, p. 15). In simple terms, the political spectrum in Serbia following Milosevic was 
split into two camps: the pro-Western parties who favored EU accession, more 
cooperation with the ICTY, joining NATO and did not take a hard line on Kosovo. On 
the other side were the nationalist parties who were against any sort of compromise on 
Kosovo or cooperation with the ICTY and were resistant to the EU and NATO. This side 
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also looked to Russia for economic aid and as an ally in international affairs 
(International Crisis Group, 2007).  
Like other post-communist states, there was a fierce debate how to transition into 
a new era. Scholar Eric Gordy split the two sides into supporters of a rapid or “hard” 
transition with those who wanted a slow or “soft” transition. Those who supported a 
“hard” transition wanted to move as fast as possible from the previous communist regime 
and replace it with a political and economic system that was closer to EU norms. These 
were the pro-Western, pro-EU parties. Supporters of this method, such as Zoran Djindjic 
of the moderate Democratic Party (DS), said that although it may be difficult for Serbia 
to make these adjustments at first, it would pay off in the long-term. On the opposite side 
were those who wanted a “soft” transition, or the nationalists. Supporters said that an 
abrupt change would be a shock to the Serbian people and safeguards must be in place to 
minimize the effects of the transition to capitalism and democracy. Vojislav Kostunica, 
head of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), argued that to assure stability, as much of 
the previous governmental and legal infrastructure should be kept in place as possible 
(Gordy, 2004).  
Kostunica and his DSS were the early winners of this debate. Kostunica was 
initially portrayed as a moderate who would support democratic institutions and lead 
Serbia into a new era. What looked like a break from the past to the outside world was 
largely a continuation of the nationalism from the Milosevic regime. Kostunica took a 
hard line on Kosovo, with his DSS party often working with the ultra-nationalist Serbian 
Radical Party (SRS) in parliament. The leader of SRS, Vojislav Seselj, has been on trial 
at the ICTY since 2003. Time and again, Kostunica put himself in an alliance with parties 
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whose main aim was to continue with Milosevic’s vision of creating a Greater Serbia 
(International Crisis Group, 2007).  
Upon coming to the presidency in 2000, Kostunica kept much of Milosevic’s 
security apparatus in place. One individual, Nebojsa Pavkovic, was eventually convicted 
of war crimes at the ICTY. In 2001, Kostunica and his party broke with the Democratic 
Opposition of Serbia coalition, the group of parties that took over following Milosevic, 
because he did not agree with Djindjic’s decision to cooperate with the ICTY. The party 
began to take in disaffected members of Milosevic’s old party, the Socialist Party of 
Serbia (SPS). Kostunica became prime minister after the assassination of Djindjic in 
2003, and the opening of Serbia to the West that Djindjic initiated was halted. After 
taking power, Kostunica appointed to office many of Milosevic’s old associates, 
including people who were still on the EU’s visa ban list. Kostunica also clamped down 
on state media, although not to the degree of Milosevic (International Crisis Group, 
2007). 
For a short time, Serbia did seem as though it was going to go in a more pro-EU 
direction. When Djindjic was prime minister, Serbia made significant steps toward 
joining Europe, despite the protests of opposition nationalist parties. His most 
controversial move was to send Milosevic to the ICTY for prosecution. He also oversaw 
a loosening of the connection between Serbia and Montenegro, navigating it in such a 
way that it did not inflame irredentist or nationalist passions. He also sought to liberalize 
and modernize the economy (Hathaway-Zepeda, 2004).  
Unfortunately, this turn away from ultra-nationalist policies was not to last. 
Djindjic was killed by remnants of Milosevic’s security forces because of his pro-EU 
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stance and his collaboration with the ICTY (Di Lellio, 2009). Following the 
assassination, Serbian public support of Djindjic’s DS party spiked. At first it seemed as 
though this would be the final impetus for Serbia to move past the shadow of the 
Milosevic era. As time passed, the investigation into the assassination dragged, and the 
energy of the populace toward reform began to wane. Also responsible for flagging 
momentum for reforms was that Zoran Zivkovic, the man who took over the premiership 
from Djindjic, was mired in a series of scandals, lessening public faith in him (Gordy, 
2004). In a eulogy for Djindjic, Bishop Amfilohije Radovic, a staunch Serbian 
nationalist, said: “This is what happens to those in Serbia who try to take her to the West; 
they always have been and always remain traitors, which is why they represent a 
legitimate target for elimination” (Di Lellio, 2009).  
The end result was that nationalist parties maintained a grip on power following 
Milosevic. In fact, many in the Serb government and security forces were also figures in 
the Milosevic regime. Kostunica did not represent a significant break from Milosevic. 
Parties obsessed with Kosovo and Greater Serbia controlled much of the government, 
allowing no space for constructive dialogue on political and economic reform. Zoran 
Djindjic tried to move Serbia in a new direction, but corrupt and violent elements in Serb 
society brutally put an end to his time as Serbia’s leader. His assassination gets to the 
crux of the problem in Serbia: the web between nationalism, corruption and crime.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
The Link between Corruption and Nationalism 
My main argument in this thesis is that nationalist politicians have used the 
Kosovo issue to augment their electoral support, thereby preventing needed reforms from 
taking place. This cycle keeps reformers from seizing enough power to make substantial 
change and keeps Serbia turned away from the EU and the West. Another factor that has 
delayed Serbia’s accession to the EU is non-compliance with the ICTY. This caused talks 
between Serbia and the EU to come to a halt in 2006 and delayed the EU passing Serbia’s 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (Prodger, 2005). 
As stated above, Serbia is split between two groups of parties: the first group is 
Western-oriented, pro-EU and willing to cooperate with the ICTY. While often espousing 
hard-line rhetoric regarding Kosovo, they are still willing to go down the path of EU 
accession. This group is more or less made up of current president Boris Tadic’s 
Democratic Party (DS), free market advocates G17 Plus, and the only group that openly 
accepts Kosovo’s secession, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (International Crisis 
Group, 2007). Slobodan Milosevic’s party, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), in recent 
years has moved away from ultra-nationalism and is now a part of Boris Tadic’s ruling 
coalition (BBC, 2008a).  
On the other side are nationalist parties who have often used fiery rhetoric on 
Kosovo and the ICTY. These parties are Vojislav Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia 
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(DSS) and the right-wing, ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS) (International 
Crisis Group, 2007). An interesting outlier party was formed in 2008, when Tomislav 
Nikloic, former presidential candidate for the Radicals, left the party after disagreements 
with its leader, Vojislav Seselj. His new party, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), is 
pro-EU but also staunchly nationalist. It will be interesting to see how it fares in the next 
elections and who it decides to work with. Nikolic has said that he will not be part of 
Tadic’s DS-led government (B92, 2011a), but also criticized Kostunica and his DSS 
party for their anti-EU position (B92, 2010).  
These differences are crucial in understanding Serbia since Milosevic. Kostunica 
was prime minister for four years, from 2004 to 2008, and also president from 2000 to 
2003. He and his DSS party had significant amounts of power during this time and the 
regime was largely a continuation of the Milosevic era. In a DSS campaign letter in the 
possession of International Crisis Group, a non-profit, non-governmental organization 
that seeks to find solutions to global conflicts, the vice president of the party claimed that 
the ouster of Milosevic was not a “revolution or an overthrow, but rather a continuation” 
(International Crisis Group, 2007, p. 3).  
During the Milosevic regime, corruption ran rampant through all levels of the 
Serbian government. By 2000, “corruption rose to a level correlated with the most 
impoverished and unstable countries in the world” (Palairet, 2001, p. 910). This is not to 
say that corruption did not take place in Yugoslavia before Milosevic, but in his regime it 
reached epic proportions. Not long after coming to power, Milosevic and his allies seized 
control of almost all state institutions, extracting what they could for their own profit. 
Milosevic’s wife formed a political party, the Yugoslav Union of the Left (JUL), which 
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soon came to be controlled by gangsters and war profiteers. The party was given control 
of Yugoslavia’s banking system, and also had significant clout in the courts. JUL was 
able to install judges who would protect their interests, allowing corruption to run 
rampant (Palairet, 2001). Milosevic’s Yugoslavia was a place where nationalism and 
corruption were tightly linked. Under Kostunica, many of these dysfunctional 
relationships continued. 
Nationalist parties, who were affiliated with organized crime and corruption 
during the Milosevic era, continued with these connections following his ouster. It is 
likely that they are fearful that moves toward the EU would threaten their livelihoods 
since accession would require significant political and economic reforms. The EU will be 
skittish about taking in corrupt countries after its experience with Romania and Bulgaria, 
so Serbia will likely have little room to maneuver regarding reform. Recognizing this, 
nationalist parties exploit legitimate concern over Kosovo to produce support, therefore 
delaying accession and protecting their interests. This gives political elites involved in 
nefarious activities space to continue business as usual at the expense of the development 
of Serbia.  
I turn now to recent data on corruption in Serbia that helps show the depth of the 
problem and the poor company that Serbia keeps in the rankings. Transparency 
International (TI) is a leading global organization in the fight against corruption. Perhaps 
its most widely cited method for measuring corruption is the Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI). It is a “composite index, a combination of polls, drawing on corruption-related 
data from expert and business surveys carried out by a variety of independent and 
reputable institutions” (Transparency International, 2010, para. 1). It is important to note 
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that TI states it is difficult to use the rankings as year-to-year comparison because 
methods and the polls used change over time (Transparency International, 2010). 
Although not a perfect metric for measurement, it at least gives some idea of what the 
state of corruption is in a country.  
In 2003, not long after Milosevic fell, Serbia ranked 106th in the world, on par 
with Zimbabwe, Bolivia, the Sudan and Honduras. A good point of comparison is 
Croatia, since it had just emerged from its own illiberal regime, which ranked 59th. 
Bosnia was 70th and Albania, just years removed from a completely collapsed 
government, ranked 92nd (Transparency International, 2003). Clearly corruption was a 
major issue in Serbia. By 2007, Serbia had risen to 79th, tied with Georgia, Saudi Arabia, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Grenada. Croatia was 64th, but Serbia had passed Bosnia and 
Albania (Transparency International, 2007). The situation remained largely the same in 
2010, with Serbia 78th in the ranking, tied with China, Colombia, Greece and Lesotho, 
among others. Croatia stayed ahead, in 62nd place. Albania was 87th and Bosnia was 91st.  
Slovenia, the only country from the former Yugoslavia to enter the EU, was 27th 
(Transparency International, 2010a).  
Although Serbia is not the worst-performing country in the Western Balkans, and 
some improvements have been made, it is still far below most EU countries and lags 
behind Bulgaria, 71st, and Romania, 69th, two countries in the EU with reputations for 
widespread corruption (Transparency International, 2010a). The problem in Serbia is that 
corruption has followed the nationalist parties from the Milosevic era to the present day. 
These parties have largely continued with Milosevic’s way of conducting governmental 
affairs, even using some of the same people, and are a major impediment to reform. 
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Timothy Edmunds writes that “Corruption and criminality also remain important 
informal institutions in Serbian politics and society” (Edmunds, 2009, p. 135). One of the 
major problems following the Milosevic era was the remnants of his security forces 
running roughshod over Serbian society. Most prominent among them was the Interior 
Ministry’s Special Operations Unit (JSO). This group utilized as many of its tools as 
possible to block reforms from taking place in Serbia, using a “range of intimidation 
tactics against reformers who were threatening its autonomy, its criminal interests, and 
potential war-crimes indictees in its ranks” (Edmunds, 2009, p. 132). Some of its 
members were involved in the assassination of reform-minded Prime Minister Zoran 
Djindjic. Although steps have been taken to crack down on organized crime, unlawful 
actors have done a better job of hiding their behavior (Edmunds, 2009).  
Clientelism and patronage networks have been a part of Serbia’s politics since the 
days of Tito. Serbia since Milosevic has continued with these practices. In order to secure 
power, politicians and parties utilize patronage networks. Complicating matters is that 
reformist parties, most prominently Boris Tadic’s and his DS, have not been able to win 
enough seats in parliament to pass tough and widespread reforms. DS has also been 
linked to its own corruption scandals, diminishing some of its credibility as a reformist 
party (Gordy, 2004). This allows nationalist parties and their underworld ties to continue 
to have a major hand in governmental affairs.  
Forming coalition governments in the Serbian system has also been difficult. 
After the elections of 2003, 2007 and 2008, it took months to build working coalitions. 
The fragile state of political affairs meant that it was difficult for politicians to take 
positions that would be politically unpopular, such as extraditing suspects to the ICTY or 
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being willing to compromise on Kosovo (Edmunds, 2009). Nationalists controlled the 
political dialogue and could continue to focus on issues such as Kosovo.  
In the 2002 and 2007 parliamentary elections, the far-right Serbian Radical Party 
(SRS) garnered more votes than any other. And in the 2008 presidential election, its 
candidate narrowly lost to Boris Tadic. SRS has been the most consistently strong party 
of the post-Milosevic era. Its leader is Vojislav Seselj, a Serbian politician who is on trial 
at the ICTY. The trial has been delayed due to allegations of witness intimidation, with 
Seselj even publicly disclosing the name of three witnesses in a book he wrote (BBC, 
2010b). It is important to note that the SRS is one party that is staunchly opposed to any 
compromise on Kosovo. When Tomislav Nikolic tried to chart a more moderate course 
for the party in the mid-2000s, he came into conflict with Seselj’s anti-West, anti-EU 
ideology. Nikolic eventually resigned and started his own party, the Serbian Progressive 
Party (Balkan Insight, 2010). 
Organized crime’s power has been especially apparent in the legal system, where 
witnesses have been intimidated or murdered, and judges have hastily resigned from 
cases involving the mafia. These realities have tied the hands of reformers and made it 
difficult to amend the system and reorient the political discourse in Serbia (Edmunds, 
2009).   
Kostunica has also proven to be a staunch nationalist. His continuation of many of 
Milosevic’s structures, coupled with his feeble attempts to cleanse Serbia of holdovers 
from the Milosevic regime, have allowed crime and corruption to become firmly rooted 
in Serbia. While prime minister, although his DSS was technically in coalition with the 
pro-EU DS party in the mid-2000s, he often looked for support from the nationalist 
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Serbian Radical Party and the party of Milosevic, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). 
This ultimately led to the government collapsing in 2007 and necessitated a new round of 
elections in 2008. In coordinating with these other parties, Kostunica was able to 
dominate Serbian political discourse with a nationalist, anti-EU bent. Until recently, 
Boris Tadic, his DS party, and other reformers had little power to change the terms of the 
debate (International Crisis Group, 2008).  
Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Kostunica increased his 
nationalist rhetoric. He severely criticized the United States and the EU and called for a 
massive protest in Belgrade. Tadic and DS backed out of the event when they saw that 
Kostunica and his nationalist supporters were going to the use the protest as a way to 
consolidate political support. The rally drew fewer supporters than expected, but was still 
between 200,000 and 300,000 people. Kostunica opened the proceedings with a fiery 
speech that blamed the West for Kosovo’s independence and thanked Russia for their 
support (International Crisis Group, 2008).  
Despite the rally’s peaceful intentions, small-scale riots and looting broke out 
across Serbia. The U.S. and Slovenian embassies were attacked in Belgrade. Although 
Kostunica condemned these incidents, Velimir Ilic, a close ally, came to the defense of 
the rioters saying that the West has “broken our state, and we only broke a few of their 
windows. They should expect that, to learn what democracy is. Breaking some windows 
is also democracy” (International Crisis Group, 2008, p. 3). Not all political parties 
agreed with the manner in which the rioters acted. Tadic, his DS party, and other 
progressive parties criticized the protests (International Crisis Group, 2008). This reveals 
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the chasm in the opinions of Serbian political elites more than a decade after the fall of 
Milosevic.  
 
Serbia’s Fight against Corruption 
Tracking corruption in Serbia is difficult. Corruption has run rampant through 
society with few checks on it since the Milosevic era. While in power, Milosevic 
controlled much of the media and security forces, so there were no entities within the 
country that could search for and expose corruption (Bozic-Roberson, 2004; Edmunds, 
2009). Although media controls have loosened to a large degree since Milosevic’s ouster, 
violence and intimidation against journalists still continues. The problem was severe 
enough that the United Nations Human Rights Committee released a document in March 
2011 that asked Serbian authorities do more to protect journalists from harm (United 
Nations, 2011).  
Compounding the difficulty in fighting corruption is that Serbian security forces 
and organized crime have had a notorious hand in Serbian society since the days of 
Milosevic, often using violence to silence any critics (Anastasijevic, 2008). The European 
Commission’s 2010 progress report on Serbia also noted that corruption in the police 
remains a significant problem (European Commission, 2010a). The same people sworn to 
protect journalists and uphold the law are also some of the most corrupt in Serb society. 
These factors combine to keep corruption hidden, making it exceedingly difficult to tie 
illegal activity to the Serbian political elite.  
The political establishment itself has done little over the years to truly tackle 
corruption. For instance, although a law was passed to track the financing of political 
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parties, parties use loopholes to keep their funding sources out of the public eye (B92, 
2011b). Serbia does have an official Anti-Corruption Council (ACC), which was founded 
in 2001 (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.). Unfortunately, this organization 
has lacked the resources and manpower to do its job effectively, a point reiterated in the 
latest EU progress report on Serbia (European Commission, 2010a).  
Liberal Democratic Party leader Cedomir Jovanovic recently said that Vojislav 
Kostunica was largely responsible for the culture of corruption in Serbia, and that 
Kostunica should not be above the law and evade responsibility for his actions. Jovanovic 
said that Kostunica  
surrounded himself with a bunch of associates, advisers, Department of State 
Security (UDBA) members, anti-Hague-profiteers, the darkest circles of society, 
organized arrests, rigged court proceedings, false indictments, media lynching, 
firing and reassigning police officers who led Operation Saber (police operation 
following Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic’s murder). Contacts with criminals were 
also personal, connected to his closest circle, and some of the people who took 
part in it fled the country in the meantime. (B92, 2011) 
  
Without any entity that has real power to go after corruption, the link between 
nationalist parties and corruption is still not direct and clear. In January 2011, however, 
Serbian news outlet B92 reported on the questionable financial activities in a coal mine. 
The leadership of the mine was appointed by Kostunica’s DSS party in 2004, upon which 
funds from the mine started to make their way to organizations around Serbia. One of the 
recipients was Srpski Sabor Dveri, an ultra-right Serb organization (B92, 2011d). 
When and if the veracity of any of Jovanovic’s accusations is ever known 
depends on the willingness of Serbian leaders to take on corruption. The activity at the 
coal mine may be just a small incident in a much larger web of deceit. Fighting 
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corruption will require a hard look into the darkest corners of Serbia’s recent past, but the 
effort could help Serbia distance itself from its difficult post-Yugoslavia years.  
One factor that may help make the fight easier, at least as long as a pro-EU 
coalition is in power, is European Union pressure on the Serbian government to combat 
corruption. For candidates and potential candidates, the EU releases yearly progress 
reports that chart the necessary reforms that need to take place within a country before 
accession. The latest report on Serbia, released in November 2010, was often critical of 
Serbia’s fight against corruption. One promising development was that public officials 
were required to declare their assets to the Anti-Corruption Council. The council received 
declarations from 16,000 of the 18,000 public workers required to register. This 
information was posted online for public viewing. The report, however, reiterated that the 
council lacked the staff and the equipment to do its job effectively. This meant that the 
ACC had to rely on other government agencies for support and did not yet have the 
capability to fully function on its own (European Commission, 2010a).  
The EU said that new laws needed to be passed that regulated political finance 
and that present laws did not give the Anti-Corruption Council enough power to 
scrutinize the Serbian political system. The EU noted that Serbia had done far too little in 
investigating and bringing to trial corruption cases. It also found that convictions in 
Serbian courts were far too low in number. When the ACC tried to implement a law that 
prevented people from holding more than one public job, a revision was passed that 
weakened the law, raising doubts among EU observers about how serious Serbia’s 
political establishment was in taking on corruption (European Commission, 2010a).  
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Some areas where the EU was most concerned were in public procurement, 
privatization and the use of public expenditure. None of these has regular independent 
auditing. Making matters worse, whistleblowers lack solid legal protections and can only 
be protected if the information they divulge is of non-classified. The EU also expressed 
concern about corruption among law enforcement officials and the judiciary. Rampant 
corruption has impacted Serbia’s government directly, making it more difficult to collect 
taxes and fund public programs (European Commission, 2010a).  
Serbia stands at a significant crossroads in its fight against corruption. Verica 
Barac, the head of the Anti-Corruption Council, said that the marriage between the 
authorities and tycoons has led Serbia to economic ruin. She said this was a stern test of 
Boris Tadic’s leadership and that “He will either make the change he needed to make in 
2000 or in 2001 or he will go down together with the tycoons” (B92, 2011e). Although 
Serbia has made some progress in its fight against corruption, it has a long and trying 
road ahead.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Serbia Since 2008 
The post-Yugoslavia era has been difficult for Serbia. An illiberal regime led the 
country into four wars, devastated the economy and made Serbia a target of international 
condemnation. While other countries in the region have modernized their political and 
economic structures and cooperated with the ICTY, Serbia has lagged behind, dogged by 
corruption and a poisonous political climate. There are signs, however, that the tide may 
finally be turning in Serbia. To help aid in understanding Serbian politics today, an 
overview of the main political parties is necessary.  
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Table 2: 
Overview of Major Serbian Political Parties 
Party Leader Orientation Background Position on Kosovo 
Democratic 
Party – 
(DS) 
Boris 
Tadic  
Center-left, 
pro-EU 
DS was founded as an 
opposition party in 1989. 
One of its most notable 
members was reformist 
prime minister Zoran 
Djindjic, who was killed in 
2003. Boris Tadic, Serbia’s 
current president, is the head 
of DS. It is pro-EU and is 
seen as cooperative with the 
demands of the ICTY. It is 
the lead party of the current 
ruling coalition, For a 
European Serbia, which 
won the 2008 parliamentary 
elections.  
 
Although it is a pro-
Western party, DS still 
takes a hard line on 
Kosovo. Its slogan in the 
2008 parliamentary 
elections was “Both EU 
and Kosovo.” Foreign 
Minister Vuk Jeremic 
went to governments 
around the world before 
the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) asking them 
not to recognize 
Kosovo’s independence. 
Shortly after the ruling, 
Boris Tadic said that 
Serbia “will never 
recognize the unilaterally 
proclaimed independence 
of Kosovo” (BBC, 
2010c).  
 
Serbian 
Radical 
Party – 
(SRS) 
Vojislav 
Seselj 
Far right, 
anti-EU 
The party is headed by 
Vojislav Seselj, who is 
currently on trial at the 
ICTY. Tomislav Nikolic 
took over the party in 
Seselj’s absence, trying to 
steer it toward more 
moderate positions. He 
focused less on maintaining 
Greater Serbia and more on 
fighting poverty, corruption 
and organized crime. 
Ultimately this led to 
disagreements between the 
two leaders, with Nikolic 
eventually resigning and 
forming his own party. 
 
The main focus of this 
party is preservation of 
Serbia’s territorial 
integrity, which includes 
Kosovo. They will not 
support any attempts to 
partition the country.  
 
Democratic 
Party of 
Serbia – 
(DSS) 
Vojislav 
Kostunica 
Center right, 
anti-EU  
DSS is headed by Vajislav 
Kostunica, who defeated 
Slobodan Milosevic in the 
contested 2000 presidential 
elections. Initially seen by 
the outside world as a 
reforming force in Serbia, 
DSS has revealed itself to be 
more nationalist as time has 
passed. Within Serbia, DSS 
is seen as less corrupt than 
other parties. 
DSS has taken a very 
nationalist stance on the 
Kosovo issues, with 
Kostunica threatening to 
suspend EU negotiations 
after some member states 
recognized Kosovo’s 
independence in 2008. 
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Socialist 
Party of 
Serbia – 
(SPS) 
 
Ivica 
Dacic 
 
Democratic 
Socialist, 
pro-EU 
 
SPS is the party founded by 
Slobodan Milosevic in 
1990. Upon Milosevic’s 
death in 2006, Ivica Dacic 
steered the party in a more 
modern and moderate 
direction. SPS has taken 
steps to separate itself from 
its illiberal past and is a 
supporter of EU integration. 
After finishing fourth in the 
2008 parliamentary 
elections, it became part of 
the ruling For a European 
Serbia coalition. 
 
 
Although part of the DS-
led, pro-EU ruling 
coalition, SPS remains 
committed to protecting 
Serbia’s territorial 
integrity, including 
Kosovo.  
 
 
Serbian 
Progressive 
Party – 
(SNS) 
Tomislav 
Nikolic 
Center right, 
mildly pro-
EU 
Formed in 2008 by 
Tomislav Nikolic, who 
resigned as leader of the 
Serbian Radical Party after 
falling out with Vojislav 
Seselj. Although a new 
party, Nikolic is a 
formidable political force in 
Serbia, narrowly losing the 
2008 presidential election to 
Boris Tadic while still part 
of the Radical Party. SNS 
favors EU integration, 
although Nikolic led 
protests against the current 
DS-led government in 
February 2011, saying that 
they had not done enough to 
bring about reforms and 
fight corruption.  
Although Nikolic is pro-
EU, the first principle of 
the SNS political 
platform is the 
preservation of Serbian 
territorial integrity, 
including Kosovo and 
Metohija.  
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G17 Plus Mladan 
Dinkic 
Center, 
market 
liberal, pro-
EU  
G17 Plus was founded as a 
non-governmental 
organization and eventually 
became political party in 
2002. G17 Plus supports 
free market reforms and 
concerted efforts to increase 
Serbian living standards. Its 
electoral base tends to be 
young and urban. It has 
formed alliances with both 
DSS and DS and are 
currently a major partner in 
the DS-led parliamentary 
ruling coalition.  
 
G17 Plus takes a 
nationalist position on 
Kosovo, saying that it 
should be a part of 
Serbia. Despite harsh 
words from some 
members following the 
ICJ ruling on Kosovo in 
July, it has not interfered 
with G17’s support of EU 
integration and economic 
reform.  
 
 
Liberal 
Democratic 
Party 
Cedomir 
Jovanovic  
Market 
liberal, pro-
EU 
The party calls for market 
reforms and an end to 
corruption in Serbian 
politics. Leader Cedomir 
Jovanovic was a major 
student leader in the 
opposition movements of 
the 1990s and a close with 
reformist Prime Minister 
Zoran Djindjic. After 
disagreeing with Boris 
Tadic on the direction of the 
DS party, Jovanovic formed 
the Liberal Democratic 
Party.  
 
It is the only major party 
in Serbia that believes 
that Kosovo should be 
recognized and that 
Serbia should move on. It 
claims that other parties 
cynically play up 
nationalist sentiment and 
therefore delay much 
needed reforms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Balkan Insight, 2010) 
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As stated earlier, a very basic understanding of current Serbian politics splits the 
parties into two groups: the pro-EU, pro-Western groups who are not as hard-line on 
Kosovo and the nationalist parties who still hold on to a dream of a Greater Serbia and 
are not willing to compromise on Kosovo. The pro-EU block currently holds the 
presidency and is the ruling coalition in parliament. It is led by Boris Tadic, the current 
president, and his Democratic Party. Also in the coalition are G17 Plus, the Liberal 
Democratic Party, and, perhaps most surprisingly, Milosevic’s old Socialist Party 
(Balkan Insight, 2010).  
The nationalist, anti-EU group is made up principally of the popular Serbian 
Radical Party (SRS) and former president and prime minister Vojislav Kostunica’s 
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). Standing in a grey area is Tomislav Nikolic’s Serbian 
Progressive Party. Nikolic held a leadership position at the Serbian Radical Party, trying 
to steer it in a more modern direction. He eventually came into conflict with the Radical’s 
true leader, Vojislav Seselj, currently on trial at the ICTY, for being too moderate 
(Balkan Insight, 2010).  
For much of the post-Milosevic era, nationalists such as Kostunica and his DSS 
party, along with the Radicals, had significant power and dominated the political 
conversation in Serbia. As the first decade of the 2000s came to a close, however, a shift 
in the Serbian electorate took place. The first sign of change was the February 2008 
presidential election. Pro-EU Boris Tadic defeated the nationalist, and then-Radical Party 
caretaker, Tomislav Nikolic. It was a narrow victory, with Tadic taking 50.5 percent of 
the vote, but was a major step for pro-EU forces in Serbia (The Economist, 2008).  
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The bigger surprise to the world was the victory of Tadic’s DS party in the May 
2008 parliamentary elections. Kosovo declared independence in February, and observers 
were expecting Serbians to support nationalist parties as a response to most EU members 
recognizing Kosovo. Voters defied expectations, however, and gave DS a shocking 
victory. Before the election, the EU lent support to pro-EU parties by offering the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement to Serbia, a vital first step toward membership, 
in late April. The EU also announced that Serbians did not have to pay for visas to enter 
17 member countries. These actions may have swung the election in the favor of DS, 
with voters believing that joining the EU was possible (The Economist, 2008a). 
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Table 3: 
2008 Serbian Parliamentary Election Results 
Party Number of Votes Percentage Number of Seats 
For a European Serbia 
Leader: Boris Tadic 
Coalition with: 
Democratic Party, G17 
Plus, Serbian Renewal 
Movement, League of 
Social Democrats of 
Vojvodina, Social 
Democratic Party of 
Serbia 
1,590,200 38.41 102 
Serbian Radical Party 
Leader: Vojislav Seselj 
1,219,436 29.45 78 
Democratic Party of 
Serbia 
Leader: Vojislav 
Kostunica 
480,987 11.61 30 
Socialist Party of 
Serbia – Party of 
United Pensioners – 
United Serbia 
Leader: Ivica Dacic 
313,896 7.58 20 
Liberal Democratic 
Party 
Leader: Cedomir 
Jovanovic 
216,902 5.23 13 
Other Parties  
(Mainly ethnic minority 
parties) 
95,205 7.72 7 
Source: (OSCE, 2008) 
 
 
Table 4: 
2008 Serbian Presidential Election Results – Final Round 
Candidate Party Votes Received Percentage 
Boris Tadic Democratic Party 2,304,467 50.31 
Tomislav Nikolic Serbian Radical Party 2,197,155 47.97 
Source : (OSCE, 2008a) 
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More progress followed when Radovan Karadzic, one of the two most wanted 
Bosnian Serb war fugitives, was captured and transferred to The Hague in July 2008 
(BBC, 2008). Although Ratko Mladic still remains at large, recent evidence shows Serbia 
is making a good faith effort in finding and arresting him. A cable released by Wikileaks 
from the United States Department of State in 2009 shows that the US and other 
countries are pleased with Serbia’s attempts to find Mladic (The Guardian, 2010). Serbia 
finally submitted its application to the EU in December 2009, but its path through the 
system was blocked by the Netherlands, who felt that Serbia was not doing enough to 
capture Mladic. The Dutch have since dropped their veto and the Serbian application can 
move to the next step of the process (The Guardian, 2010a).  
The International Court of Justice’s decision on Kosovo’s independence sparked a 
flurry of nationalist sentiment throughout Serbia. Tadic’s foreign minister, Vuk Jeremic, 
went on a worldwide tour to plead the Serbian side of the Kosovo issue to any 
government that would listen (Kurlish, 2010). The ruling, however, has not derailed 
Serbian efforts to join the EU. In August 2010, Serbia backed a U.N. resolution on 
Kosovo that contained softer language on Kosovo’s secession than the draft they had 
initially submitted. This indicated a willingness on the part of Tadic to at least entertain 
the idea of some measure compromise on the issue and put Serbia in a better position for 
EU accession (Worship, 2010).  
The EU responded with its foreign ministers passing Serbia’s request for 
membership. Tadic even agreed to talks with Kosovo, a development the U.S. and U.K. 
had been advocating (The Economist, 2010). The dialogue got underway in March 2011 
under the auspices of the EU. Critics contend that the Kosovar government, in office 
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since February, is woefully underprepared for such talks. But it could be an important 
first step toward finding some sort of solution to the Kosovo issue and allow Serbia’s EU 
accession process to continue (The Economist, 2011a).  
Conditions in Serbia are at a point where Boris Tadic and his parliamentary 
coalition may finally be able make much needed political and economic reforms. To 
appease some of the Serbian electorate, Tadic must appear as a hard-liner on Kosovo. 
Shortly after Kosovo declared independence, he said that Serbia “will never recognize the 
unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo” (BBC, 2010c, para. 9). This is where 
ethnic outbidding seems to be taking place. Ethnic outbidding is when multiple parties of 
the same ethnic group, having no incentive to bring in voters from other groups, 
constantly try to appear more nationalist than the other in order to secure votes (Brubaker 
& Laitin, 1998). Nationalist politicians have fanned the flames of Kosovo since the 
Milosevic era, keeping it a salient political issue. This push-and-pull between politicians 
and voters has created a feedback loop that has been difficult to break. 
Prior to the ICJ ruling, Vojislav Kostunica, head of the nationalist Democratic 
Party of Serbia, gave a good example of overtly nationalist Serbian sentiment. Kostunica 
said that Kosovo  
could never be a state, but only a temporary robbery and usurpation with the help 
of foreign powers. Serbian people living in Kosovo and Metohija represent the 
Serbian state and they are the best living witnesses that there is no state of 
Kosovo. That's why a pogrom was carried out on March 17 six years ago, with a 
goal to finish the ethnic cleansing of Serbs, and none of the crimes' organizers 
have been punished. (B92, 2010c)  
 
Kostunica then attacked Tadic following the unfavorable ICJ ruling, saying “we 
are now faced with the result of that devious policy where the EU is more important to us 
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than our own state” (B92, 2010a, para. 9). He went on to say “Will the person who is the 
most responsible for this flawed policy resign, or not? Holding on to power at any cost, 
new political deceptions and delusions can only lead Serbia to new and harder defeats” 
(BBC, 2010a, para. 11). Tomislav Nikolic, head of the opposition Serb Progressive Party, 
also attacked the ruling coalition. He said that costs from the fallout of the decision 
should be felt “by those who assured citizens that all (Kosovo) problems would be solved 
if only the court was reached” (B92, 2010b, para. 6). Nikolic continued to toe the line 
between being pro-EU and being a nationalist when he said that “If we should be an EU 
for 20 years in order to wait to enter the EU with Kosovo, that’s all right. Being an EU 
candidate is a good position” (B92, 2010d). Considering these conditions, it is not 
surprising that Tadic talks tough on Kosovo. A look at the 2010 Gallup Balkan Monitor 
Poll shows that Serbians continue to feel very strongly on Kosovo.  
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Table 5: 
Gallup Balkan Monitor 2010: 
Serbian Public Opinion on Kosovo 
 
1. Please tell me if you rather agree or disagree with “Kosovo has to remain part of Serbia.” 
Agree   - 73.1 
Disagree - 13.9  
Don’t know - 11.6 
Refuse to answer -  1.4  
 
2. Please tell me if you rather agree or rather disagree with “No matter what we do, Kosovo will become 
an independent state one day.” 
Agree  - 45.4 
Disagree  - 35.7 
Don’t know - 17.1 
Refuse to answer - 1.7 
 
3. Please tell me if you rather agree or rather disagree with “People in Kosovo should have the right to 
decide about their independence.” 
Agree    - 49.2 
Disagree - 37.3 
Don’t know  -  11.4 
Refuse to answer - 2.1 
 
4. Do you rather agree or disagree that as part of a future solution Kosovo could be partitioned? 
Agree   - 43.2 
Rather disagree - 37.4 
Don’t know  - 18.5 
Refuse to answer - 1.0 
 
5. Would you personally agree or disagree that the Serbian government give up on keeping Kosovo in 
exchange for EU membership? 
Agree  - 15.4 
Disagree  - 71.2 
Don’t know  - 12.5 
Refuse to answer - 0.9 
 
6. When do you think Serbia will recognize Kosovo’s independence? 
Within a year  - 4.4 
Within 5 years - 8.5 
Within 10 years -  8.1 
Never  - 67.4 
Don’t know - 11.1 
Refuse to answer - 0.5 
 
7. Do you agree or not that there will be another war in Kosovo? 
Agree  - 23.1 
Disagree - 58.2 
Don’t know - 17.4 
Refuse to answer - 1.3 
 
Source: (Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010) 
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Almost three-quarters of Serbians polled feel that Kosovo must remain part of 
Serbia. Despite this sentiment, there does seem to be some recognition that the conditions 
of the debate have changed and that Serbians must accept some difficult realities. Almost 
half agree that no matter what is done, Kosovo will be an independent state. Over 40 
percent feel that Kosovo could be partitioned as a solution. Perhaps most surprisingly, 
almost half of Serbians polled feel that people in Kosovo have the right to decide about 
their independence. Although this is merely a snapshot of how people were feeling at a 
single point in time, the numbers suggest that Serbia may be ready to move beyond 
Kosovo and on to other important issues. At this time, however, this shift in opinion is 
very tenuous. An incident in Kosovo or perceived slights from the international 
community may roll back whatever gains have been made. 
Despite enduring sentiment in the Serbian electorate and the strong nationalist 
rhetoric of almost all major politicians in Serbia, the country has made some progress on 
joining the EU, although significant obstacles remain. On the positive side, EU 
Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fule said in February 2011 that Serbia has potential to 
make swift progress toward EU accession. He praised the Serbian government for 
completing the lengthy questionnaire from the European Commission so quickly (B92, 
2011).  
In the latest country report issued by the European Commission, mentioned 
previously in the section on corruption, Serbia received mixed reviews on its progress. Its 
judicial system was still in dire need of overhaul. The report praised Serbia for its 
cooperation with the ICTY, but noted Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic were still at-large. 
The EU lauded Serbia’s improved relations with Bosnia and Croatia, as well as many EU 
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member states. Not surprisingly, the report came down hard on Serbia’s relationship with 
Kosovo, although progress was made in cooperating with the EULEX mission in Kosovo. 
The EU also took Serbia to task regarding its economic policy. The report said that much 
work needs to be done in Serbia for a true market economy to emerge. The EU also noted 
that Serbia’s labor market was in poor shape (European Commission, 2010).  
So although some progress has been made in Serbia away from ultra-nationalism, 
corruption and a hard-line in Kosovo, Serbian politics can be quite volatile. Violence or 
harassment against Serbs in Kosovo could once again make Serbs turn their back on 
Europe. Nationalist parties still have significant voter support and are ready to pounce on 
any opportunity to regain power. The EU and Serbia must chart a careful, deliberate 
course for the future. The EU must hold Serbia accountable for its actions, yet also make 
Serbia feel like it has a legitimate shot at becoming part of Europe.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER SIX 
Other Theories of Serbia’s Orientation 
I argue that the continued effectiveness of Kosovo as a political tool for rallying 
and distracting Serbian voters has contributed significantly to Serbia’s delay in EU-
oriented reform. There are, however, other compelling explanations. In a comparison 
between Serbia and Croatia, Jelena Subotic noted that many in Croatia saw themselves as 
European and that joining the EU as a way of rejoining Europe. Croatian political elites 
felt that many of the EU reforms were intrusive, but looked at themselves as Western and 
were willing to take on the changes. Subotic says that Croatians felt more like a part of 
Europe than a part of the Balkans. Croatians sought to assert their ethnic identity and 
reject Serb attempts to control the region. When they acquired independence from 
Yugoslavia, they made the state as Croatian as possible, often through ethnic cleansing or 
mass murder, but also as European as possible. Croatian elites tried to group Croatia with 
other Central European states. Throughout his authoritarian rule, Tudjman stressed that 
Croatia belonged with Western Europe. Subotic contends this made the task of joining 
the EU much easier for Croatians than for Serbians. Although the ultra-nationalism of the 
Tudjman era was a detour away from a pro-European path, Croatia returned to the road to 
Europe under Stjepan Mesic, the next leader of the country (Subotic, 2011).   
Subotic says that Serbia did not share the sentiment of rejoining Europe. Instead, 
what developed was a strong sense of ethnic identity that made Serbians the perpetual 
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victims of outside forces. During the wars of the 1990s, Serbs were fighting against the 
tide of history, which sought to attack Serbia and diminish its role in the region. The 1999 
NATO campaign in Serbia further cemented this notion of victimhood. The outside world 
and international community were not to be trusted because they were only looking to 
damage Serbia. Subotic contends that Serbians do not blame Milosevic for fighting the 
wars in the 1990s; instead they blame him for losing just conflicts. In contrast to 
Croatians, who saw only gains from joining the EU, Serbs felt that they had to lose 
Kosovo and send alleged war criminals to the ICTY to accede (Subotic, 2011).   
This outlook provides some insight into the Europeanization of the Western 
Balkans. The Serbian cultural identity of victimhood and mistrust of foreign entities helps 
explain why its road to the EU has been so circuitous. One flaw in Subotic’s argument is 
that levels of support for the EU are consistently higher in Serbia than in Croatia. The 
percentage of those who thought joining the EU was a good thing in Croatia in 2006 was 
34 percent, while in Serbia it was 60 percent (Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010). Support in 
both countries dropped in 2010, with 25 percent of Croatians saying it was a good thing 
versus 44 percent of Serbians (Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010).  
Subotic does address the high rate of support for EU accession in Serbia, saying it 
reflects an unusual dichotomy in the political discourse of the country. Serbia and Croatia 
seem to be the inverse of each other. In Serbia, the people want to join the EU but the 
elites do not, whereas the reverse seems to be true in Croatia. While Serb attitudes toward 
Europe may play a role in how Serbia has handled accession, it is clearly not the only 
answer. The Kosovo issue prolongs the life of parties in Serbia that have a staunch anti-
EU point of view. They have little incentive to reform and move past their anti-EU 
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platforms. The Serbian electorate is split between pro-EU, pro-Western forces and those 
who still see as critical the retention Kosovo and the project of Greater Serbia. The pro-
EU parties in Serbia have, until 2008, found it difficult to gain traction in parliament due 
to the continuing popularity of the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party and the 
Kostunica-led DSS. This has made forming effective governing coalitions particularly 
difficult, delaying needed reforms (Edmunds, 2009).  
Another possible critique of Subotic’s thesis is that the Serbian rejection of the 
EU has not been a refutation of European or Western values, but instead that Serbia 
upholds these values in their most pure form. Some ultra-nationalists view Serbs as the 
true defenders of Europe, fighting on the front line against the growing Islamization of 
the continent. Serbia stands not only against a growing Islamic threat, but also against 
secularization, individuality and liberal democracy. It is an extension of the myth of the 
Battle of Kosovo, that Serbs are on the front lines of the war, and along with the Serbian 
Orthodox faith, represent true European ideals (Di Lellio, 2009).  
Another theory put forward, by Dejan Anastasijevic of the European Stability 
Initiative, was that the security apparatus that was left in place following Milosevic’s 
ouster has controlled Serbian society to the extent that reform is almost impossible. The 
governments of the post-Milosevic era continued with the rampant corruption that took 
place during the 1990s. To get a sense of how powerful and reprehensible these forces 
were, they were not only involved in organized crime, but also in political assassination. 
Along with Djindjic, the reformist prime minister, the forces murdered Ivan Stambolic, 
Milosevic’s mentor and former president of Serbia, and Slavko Curuvija, a journalist and 
newspaper publisher, among others (Anastasijevic, 2008).  
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The security forces organized a special forces unit called the Red Berets, which 
not only took part in the war but also became heavily involved in the trafficking of 
smuggled goods during the embargo of Serbia. They stayed involved in the Serbian 
underground until they were finally disbanded in 2003. After Kostunica came to power, 
he did little to disband the group. A massive destruction of government documents 
related to the security forces took place shortly after Milosevic fell, but no charges were 
ever brought against the perpetrators. Anastasijevic writes that the security agencies still 
control large parts of the media, economy and government and that any reformer who 
tries to make changes “risks finding incriminating details about his private life 
published in one or more of several tabloids known to be affiliated with the agencies” 
(Anastasijevic, 2008, p. 4). Attempts at reform threaten the livelihood of a very 
dangerous, very determined group of people. After seeing what happened to Djindjic, 
Anastasijevic says that reformer politicians fear for their lives, making real attempts at 
change difficult.  
The idea that corruption and intimidation by the security forces is what is ailing 
Serbia has validity. Underworld elements have played a crucial role in Serbian political 
life. This is, however, not a problem but a symptom of the problem. The real problem is 
that corrupt, rent-seeking nationalist politicians are able to stay in power by using Kosovo 
and the ICTY to inflame passions among the electorate. The connection between 
Milosevic’s fraudulent regime and the current Serbian nationalists is a crucial part of the 
equation. These parties will do all they can to protect their interests. They use the 
legitimate concern over Kosovo in the Serbian electorate for their own benefit. In all 
likelihood, they view EU accession as a threat to their way of doing business. Without an 
overtly nationalist issue such as Kosovo to rely on, ultra-nationalist parties would have a 
65 
 
harder time staying in power, at least in their current form. Since they do have Kosovo, it 
has provided a convenient platform to protect their interests and block or delay reform, 
all under the guise of protecting Serbia and Serb identity. Unlike other very corrupt 
countries, such as Romania and Bulgaria, the corrupt politicians in Serbia never had to 
give lip service to EU accession. Hard-line nationalist sentiment in the populace has 
given them a cushion against moving toward Europe, thereby delaying reform. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis I tried to show the impact the Kosovo issue has had on incentives for 
Serbian political elites and parties. The first part of the thesis described the reasons why 
the Kosovo myth is so central to Serb identity. Serbian history was also explained, as was 
the Serbian tendency to assert itself as leader of the Southern Slavs. This caused friction 
with other ethnic groups, leading to resentment and, at times, violence. In the late 1980s, 
these historical trends culminated with a Serbian ethnic awakening and the rise of 
Slobodan Milosevic. This set Serbia on a disastrous path from which it is only now 
recovering. 
To help see how critical a role Kosovo has played in Serbian politics since the fall 
of communism, Serbia was set against its Balkan neighbors. Croatia, a country with 
which Serbia is often compared, shared a post-World War II state with Serbia and also 
had an illiberal regime following communism. Despite having much of the same 
historical trajectory as Serbia, Croatia was able to shake off the shackles of ultra-
nationalism much earlier than Serbia and make significant strides toward EU 
membership. Most of the rest of the former Yugoslavia has also been more eager to join 
the EU, with Slovenia even becoming a member in 2004. Like Serbia, Romania and 
Bulgaria had illiberal regimes and vast amounts of corruption after communism. They 
also turned to the EU much earlier. The difference between Serbia and the other states 
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was they did not have an issue like Kosovo that nationalists could exploit for votes and 
keep reforms at bay.  
A discussion of how Kosovo and nationalism has shaped the Serbian political 
landscape since Milosevic was next. After the ouster of Milosevic, much of his economic 
and governmental structures were left in place. Soft reformers, who wanted to ease away 
from the troublesome policies of the 1990s, won the debate over those who wanted a hard 
and abrupt break with the past. Although a brief period of reform took place under Prime 
Minister Zoran Djindjic, his assassination in 2003 marked a turn away from the EU and 
the West. Using Kosovo and cooperation with the ICTY as lynchpin issues, nationalist 
parties were able to set the terms of the political debate, giving reformers little room to 
maneuver on Kosovo or any sort of reform in general. 
The next section was a discussion on the connection between corruption and 
nationalism. Using data from Transparency International, we saw that Serbia is one of the 
most corrupt countries in the Balkans. Many of the corrupt actors are holdovers from the 
Milosevic era or are part of the nationalist parties. Corruption penetrates nearly all 
aspects of Serbia’s political and economic landscape, making it difficult to institute any 
sort of reform. Since Milosevic, the Kosovo issue has been exploited by nationalist 
parties to maintain power. This in turn keeps Serbia’s culture of corruption running and 
stifles any meaningful change in Serbian society. With the rise of Tadic and his pro-EU 
parliamentary coalition, Serbia has the potential to make significant changes. 
Unfortunately, from what we have seen with Romania and Bulgaria, stomping out 
corruption can be exceedingly difficult and Serbia faces a long and difficult road in 
tackling a substantial issue.  
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A discussion of Serbia since 2008 followed. The election of Boris Tadic and his 
pro-EU coalition has given hope to those who want to finally move away from Milosevic 
and his destructive nationalist policies. Despite an unfavorable ruling by the International 
Court of Justice on Kosovo’s independence in 2008, significant steps have been taken by 
Serbia to join the EU. It has officially submitted its application for membership and even 
agreed to talks with Kosovo sponsored by the EU. Although Serbia has an arduous 
journey on the way to modernization and the EU, conditions may have finally arrived 
where the Kosovo issue does not frame every political debate and true reform can take 
place. Kosovo is still vital on the minds of many, but a new reality may be dawning on 
Serbs that compromise on such an emotional issue may be the best way forward. It is 
important to remember that this is still a fragile situation, and incidents against Serbs in 
Kosovo could significantly erode the progress that has been made.  
Two other theories why Serbia has lagged behind the rest of the Balkans were 
then explored. In comparing Serbia and Croatia, Jelena Subotic contends that it was the 
cultural orientation of these two countries that has been the difference. Croatia saw the 
EU as a way to return to Europe, while Serbia felt like the perpetual victim in history and 
never saw itself as completely European. Next, Dejan Anastasijevic’s idea that Serb 
security forces were the decisive factor in Serbia’s turn away from the West was 
explored. He posits that holdovers from the Milosevic era have participated in corruption 
and assassinations that have crippled the Serbian government and made it difficult to 
make any significant reforms. Although these two theories have their merit, they do not 
tell the complete story. Without Kosovo to rely on, nationalist parties would have been 
forced to acquiesce to the demands of the Serbian electorate, who favor EU membership.  
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Future scholarship should seek to make a direct connection between Serbia’s 
political parties and corruption. Since corruption is something that is done in great 
secrecy, finding a smoking gun can be difficult. As long as nationalists have significant 
power in Serbia, finding the details of what exactly has been happening will not be easy. 
If Serbia, with luck and courageous leadership, can begin to move away from its past, 
more facts will surely emerge.    
Many observers feel that the key to peace in the Balkans is a peaceful Serbia. 
Although many more problems must be resolved, most significantly Kosovo’s status and 
Serbia’s attitude toward it, the pieces may finally be in place for Serbia to finally emerge 
from the shadow of the Milosevic era. It is likely to be a long, and at times torturous, 
road, but one well worth taking. 
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